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DOES LANGUAGE DETERMINE 
OUR SCIENTIFIC IDEAS?
H.G. Callaway
This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by commu-
nicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter 
control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the 
thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social 
practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of 
scientific belief designed to understand and insure social institutional conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
and its growth. A chief argument draws on work of Robert Axelrod concerning the evolution of cooperation.1
1. Introduction
Disputing partisan political engagement in literature, Swiss writer Max Frisch argued that while we cannot 
perhaps escape ideology, still it is already a kind of engagement to “test language in use for its reality content.” 
This is, as he puts it, “an engagement with reality, and thus a critique of ideology.” Ideology requires this con-
trol—a control exercised by literature precisely when it lacks direct political engagement, practicing independ-
ent judgment and critique of language. For Frisch, advocate of self-knowledge and a Swiss tolerance, 
engagement with reality expresses itself in social criticism and innovative usage. The point and practice are 
important for literature, but also more generally. They suggest influence of language upon cognition, viewed as 
a sociological phenomenon—but also our ability to escape a role as passive victim. In fact, something similar 
to Frisch’s “engagement with reality,” and “critique of language in use”2 is expressed in philosophy by orienta-
tion to science. For science is both crucial in human contact with reality and a forum of linguistic and 
methodological innovations for cognitive purposes.
Scientific orientation provides grounds for a critique of ideologies. From Frisch’s perspective, given his 
sympathy for German, it becomes clear that an engagement with communities and their languages can be a 
form of engagement with reality—and at the same time a critique of language and ideology. Critical judgment 
is the link between social engagement and our orientation to reality. This requires strenuous attention to 
evidence, but beyond this it is a matter of commitment to specific intellectual values—including careful atten-
tion to argumentation and its social-intellectual roles. Of particular interest here are forms of communications 
and language involving “instrumentalized” distortions of interpretation—often functioning to further collective 
conflicts. Considering this or other phenomena, we must aim for as much scientific standing as possible: a 
sociology of belief, or better, of the institutions and practices of science and philosophy. The aim is to under-
stand and insure the social conditions of the possibility of knowledge and its growth.
2. Cultural Influences on Cognition
Though fuzzy in details, some distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ seems to be required to mark off 
things we can change from those which we cannot change. For example, we cannot change the basic laws of 
physics. They are beyond our control or influence. On the other hand, however difficult this may be at times, it 
is possible to change our forms of society and our patterns of social relationships; and, of course, it is possible 
to change our languages. An individual can give up one language in favor of another, and even entire societies 
can change their languages—leastwise slowly over time. Moreover, science shows that specialized forms of 
 Originally presented at a Colloquium of the Swiss Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Bern, Switzerland, 
May 1992 and later published in Dialectica, Vol. 46, No. 3-4, 1992, pp. 225-242. Also published in my Meaning 
without Analyticity, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
1. Axelrod, Robert 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation.
2. Frisch, Max 1985, Stichworte, pp. 118-119.
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inquiry develop their own special languages. We change languages and change our languages intentionally, so 
we are also able to control, indirectly at least, the influence a language may have upon us. My claim is not that 
this is always easy, or always advantageous, but that it is possible. Hesitation on this claim points, in degree, to 
social constraints on language and its evolution: thus social constraints on cognition.
These points concerning language are as clearly true as things get. Still, there are considerable traditions of 
thought holding that conceptual systems embedded in languages, natural languages and the languages of 
philosophical systems in particular, constitute unavoidable, or virtually unavoidable, governing perspectives on 
the world. What other significance can we attach to the existence of absolutist metaphysics or ideology as a 
social-cognitive fact, and to the need to avoid them? We must assume that such systems have consequences in 
practice—often untoward consequences. Contrary to what a Peircean theory of meaning might lead us to 
expect, metaphysics and ideology have real effects—social effects. They organize or deform communities, and 
at the same time they can effectively organize (or distort) expectations, cognition and inquiry quite independent 
of scientific validity.3
Languages, viewed semantically, contain their own particular Weltanschauungen, then: they even inform 
what we will find in perception. After all, we cannot think of observation reports, as “unvarnished news.” We 
must have some particular conceptual system at a given time, and it follows that concepts or system will influ-
ence, both what we perceive and what we think, believe or say. The idea that systems of concepts may consti-
tute metaphysical impediments to science is fundamental in the positivist critique of metaphysics. There is no 
point in attacking what could make no difference. Thus, the positivist and empiricist attack on metaphysics 
indirectly recognizes their social roles. Given these roles, we have every right to expect social influences on 
language and cognition. But, cognition and science also have their influence upon society, language and 
communicative practices. There are no general grounds for comfortable acquiescence here.
Especially in light of the influence of B. L. Worf, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, related conclusions 
and suggestions have reverberated through contemporary philosophy, linguistics, and philosophy of science. 
Not without some reason, I think; though the points may be over-stressed. Thus, it has been argued that the use 
of a paradigm in research is “...by agreement, not because of compelling justifications. And the research in 
which it is used assumes it, and does not attempt its justification.”4 The reverberations are not empty, in spite of 
over-dramatization, partly because these themes make contact with more traditional scientific determinisms, in 
application to science itself—suggesting that cognition is under threat of extrinsic control just where we 
consider ourselves most sovereign. Even those most skeptical of Kuhn’s work will agree, I think, that we stand 
in need of alternatives to such accounts of sociological influences within science. One crucial point here is that 
theories may be falsified even within the “theory-laden” terms which they contribute to observation.5 Still, 
emphasis is needed upon sociological factors which contribute to, or detract from, our willingness to submit 
treasured conceptions to tests; and viewing absolutist metaphysics and ideologies as themselves sociological 
factors, embodying values, and at work as social forces, attention turns to examinations of social values em-
bodied in the institutionalization of science and belief.
There seem to be important philosophical insights at work in Kuhn’s interpretations of science, for he 
provides a sophisticated perspective from which to question traditional assumptions of empiricism—and of 
freedom of inquiry in the sciences. If what we observe and perceive stands under the formative influence of 
prior, culturally induced conceptions and practices, then, contrary to traditional empiricism, it seems implausi-
ble to hold that the recognized validity of knowledge claims can be traced merely to origins in sense-experi-
ence. Further, one expects just the kind of claim which Kuhn has occasionally emphasized: that education in 
3. Cf. Albert, Hans 1991, Traktat Äber kritische Vernunft, Chp. IV and Peter Janich et al. 1974, Wissenschaftstheo-
rie als Wissenschaftskritique.
4. Barnes, Barry 1985, “Thomas Kuhn,” in Skinner, Quentin (ed) 1985, The Return of Grand Theory in the Human 
Sciences, p. 88.
5. Cf. Quine, W.V. 1990, Pursuit of Truth, pp. 7-8.
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science, even on a “cursory inspection,” is, as he put it, designed to induce “professional rigidity,”6 that com-
mitment to paradigms and scientific consensus is induced by potent mechanisms of socialization. The challenge 
is that the rationality of science seems to be explained away, in sociological terms. The challenge calls for 
analysis of social and linguistic factors which make for independent judgment and those which discourage it. 
For, in these terms we can seek to distinguish reasonable commitment to the yet-to-be-proved hypothesis, or 
theoretical approach, from institutionalized forms of self-immunization. If sociology of belief is to have scien-
tific standing, then this will depend upon a scientific standing for the study of language and communications: a 
theme to which I now turn.
3. Language, Community and the Sociology of Belief
From a semantic point of view, it is best to consider a language as associated with a community: though there is 
a need for fine-tuned individuation of linguistic communities. To interpret language in use, we require recourse 
to evidence arising from (linguistic and non-linguistic) activities of the community in question—though we do 
not know at first who counts as a genuine member—we encounter the familiar phenomenon of recourse to 
theory to decide what to count as evidence.
Quine’s thought experiments in radical translation illustrate fundamentals of the connections between 
semantics, community and linguistic usage—the use of language in observation. However, this approach to 
radical translation depends upon evidence available within a limited kind of observation game. Other imagin-
able language games provide broader access to evidence for semantic hypotheses.7 Although access to 
argumentation within a society presupposes some mastery of observational language and logical system, it 
seems clear as well that argumentation and the kind of participation which lead to it are crucial for an overall 
understanding of language-systems. This is a point I have argued at length in a recent article.8 Conclusions 
there indicate that tolerance of argumentation is a crucial factor in our escape from socially induced rigidities or 
over-systemization. 
Language expresses and facilitates the typical activities and preoccupations of a community and constitutes 
the most articulate expression of the associated culture. Thus, though I resist the temptation to identify meaning 
and usage, it seems clear that broader access to the typical activities of a given community, and associated 
linguistic usage—argumentation included—, will provide a broader range of evidence useful for interpretation. 
Since members of a given community have, in the end, no access to it not in principle available to a guest, the 
degree of self-understanding of a community is largely a function of the degree of communications and 
openness to participation which it provides—just as we expect the work of radical translation to be facilitated 
by an openness on the part of the community we wish to understand. Thus, the degree in which a society will 
be able to overcome the limitations of its own culture and language depends upon sociological structures of 
interaction and flows of information. 
Meaning is better viewed as a matter of systems of hypotheses designed to explain abstract elements of 
usage: those which respond to truth-conditions of sentences in particular. Or, in other words, “usage” is itself 
theory-laden, and is, therefore, not something which we can access directly, without formulation of complex 
theory: usage is partly a function of belief-system and partly a function of non-linguistic intentions. Deeper 
access depends on getting involved.
Mere imitation is one element in language acquisition as we are accustomed to think, but there is more. 
Imitation becomes less important as we move away from phonetic elements in the direction of syntax, seman-
tics and pragmatics. Thus, optimal, as opposed to preliminary, situations for language acquisition are socially 
complex, eventuating in shared projects—where ends and the means to be employed are open to argumenta-
tion.
6. Kuhn, Thomas 1963, “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research,” in C.A. Crombie (ed) 1963, Scientific 
Research, p. 350.
7. Callaway, H.G. 1991,“W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth,” pp. 77-88 below.
8. Callaway, H.G. 1992, “Logic Acquisition, Usage, and Semantic Realism,” pp. 111-137 below.
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This approach to semantics and interpretation will also facilitate discussions of themes in the sociology of 
belief. It is possible to imagine a community in which the social determination of belief approaches maximum. 
An example here might be the orthodox Marxist picture of capitalism as ruled by relations of the forces of 
production and ending in all-controlling class ideologies. While it is not my view that such a society ever 
existed, it is possible to imagine it, and it would be possible, at least in degree, to remake society so as to sub-
stantially instantiate, something like Althusser’s cognitive-sociological nightmare —where all beliefs come 
under ideological suspicions.9 Paradoxically, Stalinism perhaps best approximates this Orwellian image of 
thought-control. 
More generally, it is within the power of a given society (especially given hostile external conditions) to 
maximize the social determination of belief, and institutionally viable hypothesis, by means of control over the 
flow of information, and control over patterns of participation and interactions in the community. This requires, 
in addition, similar control over interaction between members of the community and various external 
influences. We should not expect overly conservative tendencies of cultural reproduction to fare extremely well 
in our age of electronic communications and global flows of information. Still, it seems we are at pains to 
escape such influences—and here rests the plausibility of sociological determinism. A chief antidote is empha-
sis upon the value of communications. 
“Of all affairs,” as Dewey says in Experience and Nature, “communication is the most wonderful.” For by 
means of communications, things are able “to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling,” and “they 
come to that of revealing themselves to man...” For, “when communication occurs, all natural events are 
subject to reconsideration and revision..,”10 and since man and human cultures are themselves natural phenom-
ena—in Dewey’s “cultural naturalism”—it followings that communications has the power to open man and 
human culture to our view. We are able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling within a society 
to one where community and culture are open to our view and, moreover, subject to reconsideration and revi-
sion—in ways that physical laws are not.
But where reconstructive possibilities are open to us, so are the opposite possibilities. We can, if we wish, 
remake society, in the opposite way, so that community comes to depend not upon our power to change it, or 
our power to communicate and form communities of discourse, but rather upon a refusal to make use of such 
powers—upon their proscription. As Popper has aptly put it, “the future is open.” While we cannot always do 
what we want, we sometimes can. Moreover, such powers expand with our knowledge, and since knowledge 
cannot be predicted, neither can human potentialities. Knowledge of society and language has a particular 
importance here. It is even possible to change what we want, and what we may come to know about the viabil-
ity of our projects and values has a crucial role to play in this. But our ability to change or preserve aspects of 
human society is ultimately dependent upon social conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Thus, the sociol-
ogy of belief is important to science, and to the kinds of societies it makes possible. It can provide an under-
standing of the social-cultural presuppositions of science and of human control over these presuppositions. The 
sociology of belief could focus attention upon the values implicit in successful science. 
The enlightenment changed Western civilization in fundamental ways—most importantly to facilitate the 
growth of knowledge. But the social forces and individual preferences which brought Western civilization to its 
prior feudalistic conditions were not thereby abolished. It remains crucial to understand these forces and to see 
them at work in contemporary forms. Further, since communication regarding language is itself so crucial to 
our capability to change and reform language, belief, and culture, discourse on language has a special role to 
play. 
4. Socio-linguistic Regularity and Generalizations.
9. Cf. James, Susan 1985, “Louis Althusser,” in Skinner 1985, pp. 141-58.
10.Cf. Dewey, John 1927, Experience and Nature, 2nd ed., p. 166; Callaway 1993, “Democracy, Value Inquiry, and 
Dewey’s Metaphysics,” pp. 13-27.
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The human sciences are “special sciences” in the sense that they concern a limited range of phenomena.11
Often, delimitation of their range of application cannot easily be distinguished from the failure of their gener-
alizations. Moreover, since they concern human-created phenomena, their generalizations—in contrast to those 
of the “hard sciences,” range over changing and variable phenomena.
It makes little sense to apply the generalizations of economic theory to a community without trade, money, 
or the division of labor. Generalizations concerning supply and demand apply to developed market economies; 
where there is no market, e.g., in a society based upon subsistence agriculture, one expects at best some precur-
sors of the influence of supply and demand upon prices. Moreover, we expect to identify the presence or 
absence of markets and market-sustaining conditions by reference to the empirical failure or success of market 
mechanisms. Although high prices indicate scarcity, persistently high prices may indicate the artificial scarcity 
produced by restrictions on the entry of suppliers—i.e., connivance and/or market failure. Markets exist in 
various degrees, and hence the laws of the market apply only approximately as the idealizations are 
approached. Moreover, market-oriented societies may change, distorting themselves, or taking advantage of 
opportunities which become evident through economic theory itself. But none of this renders the theory of 
market economies non-empirical.
Similarly, a linguistic community is partly identified by reference to linguistic rules or generalizations 
obtaining within it. Understanding this, we come to expect that distinct linguistic communities correspond in no 
simple way to easily distinguished groups of speakers. Rather distinct linguistic communities overlap in 
complex patterns. For example, we might consider as a community all speakers of basic English—including 
both those highly accomplished in specialized areas of English and those just out of pidgin English. The 
domain of basic English might be made relatively distinct—for purposes of a test after a beginners course, or 
left vague where we wish to include those who might come to have a usable English. Speakers of basic English 
will also belong to many other linguistic communities. But none of this demonstrates that there are no 
genuinely law-like generalizations within the domain. Instead, we find a bewildering complexity of generaliza-
tions interrelated so as to drive contemporary linguistics to recursive function theory; and we find as well an 
accentuation of the problems posed by the need to select evidence in light of unsettled theory. 
For present purposes, it is much to the point to consider semantic generalizations. I want to briefly consider 
semantic rules and regularities connected with the difference between classical and intuitionistic logic. Here the 
empirical differences between corresponding communities are relatively clear—in spite of the fact that they 
have not always been noticed. “Wanton translation,” Quine had said, “can make natives sound as queer as one 
pleases. Better translation imposes our logic upon them ...”12 But, if a community employs classical disjunction, 
then we expect, allowing for failures of understanding and vagaries in the individuation of communities, that 
they will assent to every disjunction of a sentence and its own negation. However, if the community employs 
an intuitionistic logic, then they will sometimes assent to such disjunctions and sometimes not.13 Clearly this 
difference can be detected by empirical means.
Following Quine and Nozick on verdict tables,14 observation sentences or standing sentences may be inter-
preted by reference to stimulus conditions, and assent and dissent to compounds will then allow us to identify 
not only the native equivalents of ‘or’ but also differences in the underlying logic of sentential connectives. The 
point has considerable significance for debates concerning the objectivity of semantic structures and conceptual 
systems. For, while I borrow my emphasis upon the role of linguistic communities in the individuation of 
language-systems partly from Davidson, it is inviting to think of Davidson’s famous (or infamous) rejection of 
the notion of alternative conceptual systems15 as rooted in a generalization of Quine’s attributive approach to 
translating sentential connectives in Word and Object.16
11.Cf. Fodor, Jerry 1974, “Special Sciences,” and Callaway 1990, “J. A. Fodor, Psychosemantics.”
12.Cf. Quine, W.V. 1960, Word and Object, p. 58.
13.Nozick, Robert 1986, “Experience, Theory and Language,” in Hahn L. and P. Schilpp (eds.) 1986, The Philoso-
phy of W. V. Quine, pp. 339-63, p. 361.
14.See also Quine, W.V. 1973, Roots of Reference, pp. 75ff.
15.Davidson, Donald 1974, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” reprinted in
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Thus in “Radical Interpretation,” (1973)17 Davidson claims that to devise “a theory of truth for an unknown 
language,” we are to “first look for the best way to fit our logic...on to the new language.” He notes that “this 
may mean reading the logical structure of first-order quantification theory (plus identity) into the language...” 
In a footnote, he mentions that his method, in contrast to that of Word and Object, “forces quantificational 
structure on the language to be interpreted.” Quine emphasizes the principle of charity only with respect to 
“pure sentential connectives,” (a view he substantially modified in Roots of Reference, 1973), while Davidson 
applies the principle of charity “across the board.”18 Paradoxically, such ill-conceived “charity” seems to extin-
guish all conceptual differences as a condition of the possibility of translation! Being less “charitable,” we may 
actually detect what is distinctive among our linguistic neighbors. 
Though we may imagine various difficulties and complications in the application of empirical tests, there is 
little room to doubt that Nozick’s test is serviceable. Thus, there is little reason to doubt that empirical evidence 
will allow us to distinguish versions of sentential logic and corresponding communities. Still, the discussion of 
this test is, quite properly, a scientific systemization of processes in normal language acquisition. If someone 
acquires classical logic by the normal routes of socialization, questions systematically revealing of logical 
system are unlikely to be involved. Other methods, focusing upon social cooperation, rather than linguistic 
investigations, suggest a more realistic approach to the details of language acquisition and the relation of this to 
social forces.
5. Cooperation and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
One conclusion here concerns the importance of information concerning action to the acquisition of language. 
As Davidson has urged in other connections, game theory and considerations of action have a role to play in 
theories of the evidence available for interpretation.19 Linguistic action is nested within systems of other sorts 
of action: thus both initial and more sophisticated interpretations of linguistic actions and linguistic expressions 
are able to draw upon a broad context of knowledge concerning who is doing what in particular situations. Ac-
quisition of linguistic competence, and semantic competence in particular, is thus shown possible in ways 
dependent upon systems of interaction and the understanding of action in concrete situations. The point here 
depends upon a recognition that it is possible to (fallibly) note specific causal connections without, at the same 
time, acquiring a knowledge of covering laws.20
Though retaining the external perspective of one’s own language and belief-systems, the application of 
game theory to problems of interpretation strongly argues that access to adequate evidence for translation/ 
interpretation requires the researcher to enter into the culture under study as an active participant. The attitude 
of distant and “objective” observer, in contrast, blocks needed evidence. So long as linguistic meaning is not 
identified with actual usage, it is evident that meanings are only imperfectly reflected in usage. Thinking of 
sentence meanings as truth-conditions, for instance, usage is not merely a function of what is believed true (or 
any other single factor). A great variety of extra-linguistic intentions and purposes (including many linguistic 
intentions beyond that of stating what one takes to be true) also play a role in determining the usage of 
language in a given community and on a given occasion. One objective here will be to explore this point, in a 
fairly rigorous way. 
The point is worthy of illustration and deeper examination, because where we know independently what 
someone is trying to do, and especially what he is trying to do by means of his words, this information is of 
Davidson 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 183-98. 
16.Cf. Callaway, H.G. 1992, “Logic Acquisition, Usage, and Semantic Realism,” below. 
17.Davidson, Donald 1984, “Radical Interpretation,” reprinted in Davidson 1984, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, pp. 125-140.
18. Ibid., p. 136.
19.See Davidson, Donald 1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” reprinted in Davidson 1984, Inquiries into Truth 
and Interpretation, pp. 141-54; Davidson 1980, “Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action,” pp. 1-12.
20.Davidson, Donald 1963, “Actions Reasons and Causes,” reprinted in Davidson 1980, Essays on Action and 
Events, pp. 3-20.
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considerable import for understanding or interpreting what he has to say. Being in a position to distinguish a 
statement from an imperative, for example, is only the most obvious illustration of this type of phenomenon. 
We depend upon a wealth of common-sense knowledge of ordinary purposes and intentions to disambiguate 
and interpret as the need arises. 
Similarly, we can appreciate how the game-theoretic concept of cooperation has a role to play in theories of 
the evidence available for interpretation. Where we attempt cooperation, goals and intentions are communi-
cated and become clear on either side, or relatively clear in any case; and to the extent that someone’s extra-lin-
guistic goals and intentions can be treated as known, this will constrain interpretation of utterances and ulti-
mately constrain the interpretation of the relevant linguistic system. 
It will be useful, therefore, to consider some recent advances in game theory, highly relevant to the notion 
of cooperation, and capable of application to problems of interpretation and language acquisition. These are 
results related to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and strategies which have special relevance to social situations 
or processes which can be understood as instances of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The development of 
cooperation depends in part upon a transfer of information between the parties involved; and conventions of 
language can be thought of as instances of the kind of information we need to communicate (or possess) in 
order to facilitate the special kind of cooperation involved in belonging to, or participating in, a particular 
linguistic community. All of this suggests modeling language acquisition, acquisition of semantic competence, 
and the transfer of semantic information in general, upon the development of cooperation which is possible 
under conditions of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is defined in terms of a payoff matrix such as the following which is adapted from 
Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984): 
Column Player
Cooperate        Defect
***********************************
Row * Cooperate  R=3,  R=3    S=0, T=5
Player * Defect       T=5,   S=0    P=1,  P=1
Each player chooses simultaneously (or in ignorance of the other player’s choice) one of the two options, either 
to cooperate or to defect. (What counts as cooperation or as defecting is usually assumed to be clear from the 
description of the specific situation, in other cases, this becomes clear by means of a series of interactions.) The 
two choices together determine the payoffs to the two players. Thus, for instance, if the column player chooses 
to defect while the row player chooses to cooperate, then the result is to be found in the upper right-hand corner 
where the row player gets S = 0, the “sucker’s payoff” and the column player gets T = 5 which is “the tempta-
tion to defect.” The lower right-hand corner shows the result when both players choose to defect—each gets 
one point. This is P = 1, the “punishment for mutual defection.” Where each player chooses to cooperate, they 
each get 3 points— as is shown in the upper left-hand corner. This is R = 3, “the reward for mutual coopera-
tion.” 
What is crucial to the prisoner’s dilemma is not how these scores are interpreted—the particular rewards or 
punishments—, but rather the relative values of the outcomes (as defined for each player independently): T > R 
> P > S. So long as the temptation to defect is greater than the reward for mutual cooperation, and this in turn is 
greater than the punishment for mutual defection—which is greater in turn than the sucker’s payoff—, then we 
have an instance of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
This involves a dilemma in view of considerations which arise independently for each player. Thus suppose 
you are the row player and you are trying to decide what to do. You must consider two options of the column 
player: the column player will either cooperate or defect. Suppose that the column player is going to cooperate. 
If you cooperate too then you get 3 points, the reward for mutual cooperation. However, if you defect then you 
get 5 points, the temptation to defect. Thus, where the other player will cooperate, then it is best to defect. 
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But suppose, on the contrary, that the other player will defect, you still have two choices. If you cooperate, 
then you get 0 points, the sucker’s payoff; however, if you also defect, then you will at least get 1 point, the 
punishment for mutual defection. Thus, where the column player will defect, then it is better to defect yourself.
The dilemma is, then, that it appears to be always better to defect—regardless of what you think the other 
player will do—, and this in spite of the fact that both players will do better from mutual cooperation. 
“What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge,” Axelrod remarks, “is the fact that the players might 
meet again.”21 For, if we assume only one interaction, or that the interactions will be limited to a finite and 
know number, then there will be no incentive to cooperate. Assume, for instance that there will be only one 
interaction. The reasoning above will thus govern this single interaction and both players will have an incentive 
to defect. But, if they will both defect in the case of a single interaction, then the same reasoning leads to 
mutual defection on the last of a series of interactions of known and finite length. This reasoning tends to move 
back along the chain to the present.22 (The point is evident, e.g., where employees change jobs in a bureauc-
racy. As the date approaches cooperation declines and hostility becomes overt.) 
This quite simple scheme for a non-zero sum game expressed in terms of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
has found application in analysis ranging from international relations to biological symbiosis, and it casts light 
upon a great variety of applicable situations. In a zero-sum game such as chess, in contrast, it makes no sense to 
attempt to cooperate with one’s opponent, for there is no possibility in the nature of the game for a player to 
benefit by cooperation. Thus, the strategies of zero-sum games are typically quite complex and elaborate. It 
makes little sense in a zero-sum game to allow one’s opponent to become aware of one’s strategy or intentions. 
Strategies become Byzantine. However, Axelrod shows that in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the best overall 
strategy to follow, in most situations, is a very simple one which combines a willingness to cooperate with the 
refusal to be exploited. Moreover, there is an advantage to having one’s opponent aware of the strategy one 
intends to employ. 
6. TIT FOR TAT and Linguistic Cooperation
The most important strategy in Axelrod’s work is TIT FOR TAT. While this is not the best strategy to follow in 
every possible circumstance, it turns out to be a quite crucial strategy for a large number of possible situations. 
For example, if one’s opponent is using the strategy ALL D, defecting on every move, then one cannot do 
better than to use the same strategy in reply. However, Axelrod does show, by means of computer simulations 
of tournaments involving a great variety of possible strategies, that TIT FOR TAT, is extremely robust and 
successful in a vast number of possible situations: both where it plays against similar strategies and where it 
plays against strategies which attempt exploitation. 
Yet, TIT FOR TAT is a relatively simple strategy to apply and follow. It calls for a player to cooperate on 
the first move of a sequence and thereafter to do whatever the opponent did on the last move. Thus TIT FOR 
TAT cooperates with those willing to cooperate and defects from those who show unwillingness to cooperate in 
their actions. Making use of TIT FOR TAT, one stands the best chance of finding those players who are in fact 
willing to cooperate. 
It will be useful here to think of language learning situations as involving a version of the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma where both sides make use of TIT FOR TAT (or other strategies). As we shall see, making use of 
these assumptions, it will be possible to think of a sequence of moves in a game of iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
as a means for either side to communicate, quite wordlessly, what is to count as cooperation as viewed by the 
other side. This is a kind of information which is not always available at the start of a sequence of interac-
tions—even where there is mutual intention to cooperate. Thus, focusing on linguistic cooperation, and espe-
cially the observance of semantic conventions, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma provides an approach to the 
acquisition of semantic competence. 
21.Axelrod 1984, p. 12.
22.Cf. Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa 1957, Games and Decisions, pp. 94-102.
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In this context, willingness to cooperate amounts to a willingness to communicate. The point suggests that 
complexity of strategy is a direct functional indication of reluctance to communicate, and this suggests in turn 
that complexity of linguistic forms is indicative of reluctance to cooperate: as one might well expect, clarity 
and simplicity of expression are very important to wider communications. Further, since evaluation of claims 
made depends upon their being communicated and understood, we fully expect that scientific communications 
will be bound by simplicity and clarity of expression; obscurantism is simply a refusal to cooperate in the 
scientific enterprise. 
7. Language, Cooperation and Social Structures
Axelrod explores factors giving rise to social structures among interacting groups in terms of the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma. Of special importance to language and language acquisition is what is called labeling. “A 
label is a fixed characteristic of a player, such as sex or skin color, which can be observed by the other player. It 
can give rise to stable forms of stereotyping and status hierarchies.”23 Clearly, there are linguistic as well as 
non-linguistic forms of labeling, and the effects connected with the labels of sex or skin color are also associ-
ated with observable linguistic features: dialect, social register and accents. In a highly intellectual atmosphere, 
the effects of labels can also be found associated with semantic differences, reflecting points of view and intel-
lectual affiliations. 
Labels are important because people can begin their interactions with strangers on the basis of expectations 
that they will act and react in known ways. The advantages of observing labels and of being labeled are directly 
connected with the creation of expectations: 
One of the most interesting but disturbing consequences of labels is that they can lead to self-confirming stereotypes. To 
see how this can happen, suppose that everyone has either a Blue label or a Green label. Further, suppose that both groups 
are nice to members of their own group and mean to members of the other group. For the sake of concreteness, suppose 
that members of both groups employ TIT FOR TAT with each other and always defect with members of the other group. 
...Then a single individual can do no better than to do what everyone else is doing and be nice to one’s own type and mean 
to the other type.24
In view of the incentives, “stereotypes can be stable, even when they are not based on any objective differ-
ences.”25 Moreover, the assumed conditions are not in the least unlikely. We are all aware, in degree, of effec-
tive stereotypes: those based on race, or skin color or national origin. Still, it is of special interest to appreciate 
how each individual has a strong incentive to participate in systems of stereotyping and discrimination. This is 
what Axelrod finds so disturbing in his results: he captures the social phenomenon of self-serving discrimina-
tion in game-theoretical terms. The account is compelling and chillingly simple. 
Strategies tend toward collectively stability, as a function of the importance of future interactions in 
comparison with the present. If we assume the payoff matrix given above, then TIT FOR TAT will be collec-
tively stable provided that the next interaction is 2/3 as important as the present interaction. Under such 
conditions, if everyone else is using TIT FOR TAT, then an individual player can do no better than by 
employing the same strategy. A group of players using this strategy in their interactions with each other cannot 
be invaded by players employing an alternative strategy. By definition, an alternative strategy will not come to 
replace a collectively stable strategy. 
Thus, in a range of situations described, the stereotypes lead to incentives to conform to the system. Anyone 
who departs from it will see scores drop. For example, if a blue player attempts to break the stereotypes and use 
the strategy TIT FOR TAT in interactions with a green player, then since all green players use ALL D with the 
blue players, the blue player will get 0 points, the sucker’s payoff, rather than 1 point, the punishment for 
mutual defection, whenever attempting cooperation with a green player. There are incentives, for each individ-
ual, to maintain the system and to act in accordance with the stereotypes. Now imagine the prospects of 
cooperative research between distinct traditions under similar conditions. 
23.Axelrod 1984, pp. 145-46
24.Axelrod 1984, p. 147.
25. Ibid.
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Labels also play an important role in maintaining status hierarchies. Thus, suppose that everyone in a 
particular group has a particular characteristic in some definite degree. Examples are strength, or height, or skin 
tone, or an assigned position. Axelrod describes a status hierarchy in terms of strategies: “everyone is a bully 
toward those beneath them and meek toward those above them.”26 (Interestingly, German has a derogatory 
word for this: ‘Radfahrer’.) We can imagine that everyone uses a certain strategy in interactions with those 
above in the hierarchy: “cooperate unless the other player defects twice in a row, in which case never cooperate 
again.” This strategy is relatively meek. The player allows himself to be a sucker on alternative moves. Still, it 
also shows some provocability—it will not tolerate more than a certain amount of exploitation. In contrast, 
when meeting subordinates in the hierarchy, one uses a “bully” strategy: “alternate defection and cooperation 
unless the other player defects even once, in which case never cooperate again.”27
Obviously, the players at the top of the hierarchy will do very well, and those at the bottom less well. 
However, it is important to see that the situation will be stable where “the discount parameter is high 
enough”—that is, where future interactions in the same group are relatively important. (This factor is effected, 
e.g., by physical propinquity and geographical and professional immobility.) For in the case of an isolated 
revolt from below, that player’s scores will sink drastically. The reason is that “it would be better to take one’s 
medicine every other move from the bully than to defect and face unending punishment.”28 Thus, even those at 
the bottom of an insulated social hierarchy have considerable incentive to maintain it—especially given expec-
tations of later advances in the hierarchy. Now, consider the effects on career advancement of a critical attitude 
expressed by a student within a hierarchical institutional environment. 
These analyses illustrate the facility of game theory to illuminate the inner structure of social phenomena. 
We see a quite pervasive human social structure which can be made more specific by examples of tribalism and 
nationalism—or intellectual affiliations. So imagine that each tribe or nation uses a label which maintains its 
distinctness from every other and that a hierarchy is instituted within each group on the basis of the degree to 
which a particular person exemplifies the positively evaluated tribal or national traits. Whatever the value of the 
system to those who participate in it, disadvantages are also evident: quite pervasive human problems centered 
on collective conflict, conflicts we know to be avoidable in principle but which may appear inevitable. We 
know that such conflicts are avoidable in principle because we know that groups structured in terms of the 
above considerations could often benefit by breaking down stereotypes preventing wider cooperation. Still, 
conflicts among groups often appear unavoidable because we are familiar with the incentives which maintain 
the system. 
8. Conclusions
I can only briefly suggest some implications of Axelrod’s work for the sociology of belief and related issues 
regarding language and communicative practice. The chief implication is that communications highly 
structured by labeling with regard to intellectual affiliations and dependent upon strongly hierarchical institu-
tional structures tend toward insularity and dogmatism.29 Under such conditions, one also expects a 
development of language-systems suited to facilitate insularity and dogmatism: key terms playing the roles of 
labels for intellectual affiliations tend toward greater obscurity, general claims with similar social-institutional 
functions tend toward multiple and complex ambiguities. Language becomes stilted by attempts to insulate key 
expressions from deeper examination or criticism. These changes function to guard insiders against outsiders, 
to carry on mock debates with opponents, and to maintain social hierarchy. 
Special dangers exist in socially defined and intensely hierarchical schools of thought—a point reflected in 
early modern disdain for “scholasticism.” For, we expect that membership or advancement is only possible by 
strict adherence to stereotypical thinking, and disdain for critical attitudes—styles of education which over-
emphasize reproduction of isolated and internally defined tradition. The points here help clarify the connection 
26. Ibid., p. 149.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 150.
29.Cf. Albert 1991, pp. 116-17.
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between science, democratic participation and the social character of language. More democratic social 
relations are required for broader, deeper argumentation. Otherwise, emerging problems and innovative view-
points remain under-developed, unarticulated or ignored. Unfortunately, in situations of intensive competition 
(of whatever sort) recognition for outsiders (or those with low status-ranking) is often the first victim. Yet these 
people are often key social representatives of criticism. 
Failing deep moral concern for democratic participation based on the cognitive value of contributions, exist-
ing viewpoints and schools may reproduce in hot-house monocultures, cut off from improvements and correc-
tions. We need ladders within existing social and institutional structures of scientifically oriented thought and 
bridges between traditions—things which over-competitive conditions strongly tend to eliminate. The hypo-
thetical-deductive method, in particular, may come to resemble a rationalization for ideology or absolutist 
metaphysics, without due stress on the search for potentially falsifying evidence and deep consideration of 
alternative hypotheses. The social-institutional correlate of this, in science and philosophy as elsewhere, is en-
gagement to “test language in use for its reality content:” an emphasis upon clear, tolerant, and unpartisan 
participation, including searching and critical argumentation and research. Failing this, language tends to dete-
riorate to the level and type of conflicts it serves. The root plausibility of sociological determinism appears 
linked to strategies of social-institutional reproduction arising from excessive competition and overly collec-
tivized career identities. Objectivity is fostered by reaching, with tolerance and a critical eye, across the 
boundaries of cultures, generations, schools, and institutions. 
